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CASENOTE
RECOVERY OF MONITORING COSTS UNDER THE OPA:
MONEY FOR NOTHING
UnitedStates v. Hyundai MerchantMarine Co., Ltd'
I. INTRODUCTION

Since the introduction of legislation concerning oil pollution in middle 1800s, there have been fragmented
statutory schemes. In an effort to make oil pollution legislation more uniform, Congress passed several statutes
and acts during the 1970s and 1980s; however, legislators never attained their goal of uniformity. With the
legislative evolution came changes as to the liability of persons or entities responsible for oil pollution. In
Congress's most recent effort, the Oil Pollution Act of 1990,2 lawmakers again had intentions of making oil
pollution laws uniform, but also set out to extend the liability of a responsible party. In doing so, Congress
made responsible parties liable for costs incurred during the removal of an oil spill.4
The focus of this Note is on the scope of a responsible party's liability. More specifically, are the costs
incurred by the government recoverable from the party responsible for an oil spill when the government merely
monitored but did not participate in the oil removal effort? While the Ninth Circuit recently answered the
question in the affirmative, this Note will offer a viable alternative to that court's holding. As mentioned below,
the Ninth Circuit's approach to the question is correct when only the applicable federal statutes are considered;
however, the court does not adequately consider the policy it created nor the legislative intent behind the
statutes.
II. FACTS AND HOLDING

Hyundai Merchant Marine Co. ("Hyundai") operated the bulk carrier M/V Hyundai No. 12 in the area
around the Shumagin Islands of Alaska.s On October 2, 1991, the vessel, carrying 200,000 gallons of bunker
oil, ran aground and fractured the ship's holding tanks, exposing the bunker oil to the sea.6 During the fifth and
sixth days after the vessel ran aground, storm winds blew the vessel more than 100 degrees around causing oil
to leak from the vessel into the sea covering an area 2000 feet in length and creating the potential for more
leakage.7 The oil leakage threatened several species of wildlife.! The Coast Guard responded to the emergency
and for eleven days stood by with personnel and equipment capable of containing the existing oil spill and any
oil that may further seep from the vessel.9 Hyundai performed the actual labor of containing the oil spill by
preventing further leakage, freeing the ship from the rock on which it was perched, and towing the ship to
harbor where the vessel could be properly mended.'o The United States sued for recovery of costs incurred by
the Coast Guard in monitoring the aforementioned oil spill under section 2702 of the Oil Pollution Act of 1990
("OPA")." The OPA permits recovery from the responsible party of those costs and damages suffered by the

United States v. Hyundai Merchant Marine Co., Ltd., 172 F.3d 1187 (9th Cir. 1999), cert. denied, 120 S.Ct. 397 (1999).
Oil Pollution Act of 1990, 33 U.S.C. §§ 2701- 2761 (1994).
Michael P. Donaldson, The Oil Pollution Act of 1990: Reaction andResponse, 3 VILL. ENVTL. L.J. 283, 288-89 (1990).

Daniel Kopec & Philip Peterson, CrudeLegislation:Liabilityand Compensation Under the Oil PollutionAct of 1990,23

RUTGERS L.J. 597,618 (1992).
5 Hywndai, 172 F.3d at 1188. The
6 Id. at 1188-89. Bunker oil has a

Shumagin Islands are roughly 260 miles west of Kodiak. Id.
thick consistency and must be heated before being pumped. Id. at 1188. If evaporation occurs it
is slow, and dispersion is poor when released into the environment Id.
Id. at 1189.
a Id.
9 Id.
1o Id. Hyundai consulted the Coast Guard regarding its plan for dealing with the emergency. Id. The Coast Guard approved the
proposed plan, and Hyundai proceeded at its own sizeable expense. Id.
" Id. Oil Pollution Act of 1990, 33 U.S.C. § 2702(a) (1994).
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United States, or another private party, in removal and containment of oil spills into navigable waters. The
United States further sued for penalties under the Debt Collection Act,' 3 which provides for penalties in the
form of interest for unpaid claims made by the United States.14 The district court held that the OPA and Debt
Collection Act were both applicable and awarded the United States $1,702,553.5 ." Hyundai brought an
appeal before the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, contending under the OPA, that the United States is
not entitled to recover costs for monitoring Hyundai's clean-up efforts, that costs must be necessary to be
recovered, and that base costs are not recoverable.' 6 Hyundai further argued that the Debt Collection Act did
not apply, that the United States could not recover attorney's fees under the OPA, and that the wrong rate
schedule was used in calculating the Coast Guard's costs in monitoring the emergency. 17 The appellate court
affirmed the district court's ruling in all but one respect.'s It held that when the United States sues for damages
resulting from the Coast Guard monitoring an oil spill clean up of which the actual clean up was performed by
and at the expense of the responsible party, the OPA is applicable. 9 Thus, the United States can recover
damages, regardless of necessity, including attorney's fees and base costs.20 The court also concluded that
because the OPA provides for interest on damages, the Debt Collection Act is inapplicable. 2 ' Hyundai was
therefore responsible for the damages sustained by the United States with the exception of penalties that would
have been owed had the Debt Collection Act been applicable.22
III. LEGAL BACKGROUND
There are two main issues presented in UnitedStates v. Hyundai MerchantMarine Co., Ltd.2 First,

whether monitoring costs, attorney's fees, and base costs that result from monitoring an oil spill prevention and
clean up effort are recoverable under the OPA from a responsible party. 24 Second, if such costs are recoverable,
whether penalties can be assessed against the responsible party under the Debt Collection Act. 25 The Ninth
Circuit considered these two issues as a case of first impression in all circuits. 26 There are, however, one case
from the Eastern District of Louisiana dealing with the recovery of monitoring costs under the OPA27 and one
case from the District of Columbia Circuit that touches on a closely related issue.28 While these cases do not
dispose of the issues, they offer holdings consistent with that of the Ninth Circuit.

12 Hyundai, 172 F.3d at 1189. The statute reads, "[e]ach responsible party for a vessel
or a facility from which oil is discharged, or
which poses the substantial threat of a discharge of oil, into or upon the navigable waters or adjoining shorelines or the exclusive
economic zone is liable for the removal costs and damages." 33 U.S.C. § 2702(a) (1994). Removal costs include, "all removal costs
incurred by the United States." Id. § 2702(bX1 XA).
13 Debt Collection Act, 31 U.S.C. § 3717(aX 1) (1994). The statute reads, "[t]he head of an executive, judicial, or legislative agency
shall charge a minimum annual rate of interest on an outstanding debt on a United States Government claim owed by a person that is
equal to the average investment rate for the Treasury tax and loan accounts for the 12-month period ending on September 30 of each
year, rounded to the nearest whole percentage point." Id. The statute does not apply, "if a statute, regulation required by statute, loan
agreement, or contract prohibits charging interest or assessing charges or explicitly fixes the interest of charges." Id. § 3717(gX 1).
14 Hyundai, 172 F.3d at 1189.

15 Id.
16 Id. Base costs are costs "such as the salaries of personnel, that the Coast Guard would have incurred even were it not responding
to the Hyundai No.12's distress." Id. at 1192.
" Id. at 1189.
18 Id.
'9 Id. at 1192.

id
Id. The appellate court further held the rate schedule used was in effect at all times relevant and was the proper rate
schedule to be
used in calculating the cost of the Coast Guard activity. Id. at 1193.
22 id
23 Id at 1188-89.
24 Idatl118.
25 id
26 id
27 See infra notes 47-83 and accompanying
text.
28 See infra notes 84-99 and accompanying
text.
20

21
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A. The Oil PollutionAct - Relevant Provisions
The Oil Pollution Act ("OPA') was passed by Congress in 1990 after 15 years of drafting. 29 Though

Congress began work on the OPA several years prior to the Exxon Valdez oil spill, it played a major roll in the
Congressional effort to enact the OPA.30 The OPA was passed as an effort to make uniform several fragmented
laws regarding oil spills. 3 1 Congress further wanted to provide adequate compensation to those injured by oil
spills and to ensure that damage to natural resources would be kept to a minimum.3 2 Following is a discussion
of the OPA provisions relevant to the Hyundai case.
Before determining the scope of the OPA regarding recovery of costs, the person liable for the oil spill must
first be identified. The OPA refers to the liable person as the "responsible party."33 The responsible party with
regard to a vessel is defined in section 2701 of the OPA as, "any person owning, operating, or demise chartering
the vessel."3 As a result, anyone falling within one of the three categories can be a responsible party and can
be held liable for those costs recoverable under the OPA.
After determining who the responsible party is, the costs that are recoverable under the OPA must be
evaluated. Stated another way, it must be determined for what amount the responsible party will be liable.
Section 2702(a) of the OPA imposes on a responsible party liability for removal costs and damages resulting
from an oil spill.35 While the OPA defines removal costs in section 2701(3 1) as "the costs of removal that are
incurred after a discharge of oil has occurred or, in any case in which there is a substantial threat of a discharge
of oil, the costs to prevent, minimize, or mitigate oil pollution from such an incident,"36 section 2702(b)(1)

further expounds on what things are included as removal costs. 37 Removal costs as defined by section
2702(b)(1)(A) include "all removal costs incurred by the United States ... under subsection (c), (d), (e), or (1)of
section 1321 of this title."" Although it appears that section 2702(b)(1)(A) of the OPA does not shed much
light on what additional removal costs are covered by the Act, a look at the referenced section adds clarity to
this portion of the OPA. As stated above, the OPA references section 1321 of the Federal Water Pollution

Control Act ("FWPCA"). 9 Section 1321 of the FWPCA states that "[t]he President shall ... ensure effective

and immediate removal of a discharge, and mitigation or prevention of a substantial threat of a discharge, of oil
or hazardous substance" into the navigable waters of the United States." Sections 1321 (c)(1)(B)(i) and (ii)
further provide that in carrying out this task, the President may "remove or arrange for the removal of a

discharge, and mitigate or prevent a substantial threat of discharge, at any time" and "direct or monitor all
Federal, State and private actions to remove a discharge."4A Section 1321(c)(2)(A) further authorizes the
President to "direct all Federal, State, and private actions to remove the discharge or to mitigate or prevent the
threat of the discharge" if the "discharge, or a substantial threat of a discharge, of oil or a hazardous substance
from a vessel ... is of such a size or character as to be a substantial threat to the public health or welfare of the
United States"4 2 Therefore, any costs resulting from the President's action authorized through these sections of
the FWPCA are included as removal costs under the OPA.43

2 Donaldson, supra note 3, at 288.
3 Jeffrey D. Morgan, The Oil PollutionAct of 1990: A Look At Its Impact on the Oil Industry, 6 FORDHAM ENvTL. L.J. 1, 1 (1994).

The Exxon Valdez spilled 10.9 million gallons of oil in Prince William Sound of the coast of Alaska. Id.
31 Kopec & Peterson, supra note 4, at 618.

id.
3 Oil Pollution Act of 1990, 33 U.S.C. § 2702(a) (1994).
3 Id. § 2701(32XA).
3 Id. § 2702(a). This section reads "each responsible party for a vessel or a facility from which oil is discharged, or which poses the
substantial threat of a discharge of oil, into or upon the navigable waters or adjoining shorelines or the exclusive economic zone is liable
for the removal costs and damages specified in subsection (b) that result from such incident." Id.
6 Id. § 2701(31).
Id. § 2702(bX 1).
32

Id. § 2702(bXIXA).
Id. § 2702(bXIXA).
4 Federal Water Pollution Control Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1321(cXIXA) (1994).

4' Id. § 132 1(cXIXBXi), (ii).
42 Id. § 1321(cX2).
4 Oil Pollution Act of 1990, 33 U.S.C. § 2702(bXXA) (1994).
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Finally, the OPA charges interest on amounts recoverable." The interest is calculated "at the average of the
highest rate for commercial and finance company paper of maturities of 180 days or less obtaining on each of
the days included within the period for which interest must be paid to the claimant, as published in the Federal
Reserve Bulletin."
B. Cases Permittingthe Recovery ofMonitoring Costs Under the OPA.
While the Ninth Circuit is the first circuit court to decide the issue of whether monitoring costs should be
included in removal costs under the OPA," the Eastern District of Louisiana has dealt with precisely this
issue.47 In United States v. Conoco, Inc.48 the court held that monitoring costs are recoverable as removal costs
under the OPA.49 The facts of the Conoco case are relatively straightforward. Conoco, Inc. ("Conoco") was the
responsible party for two oil pipelines located in or near the Gulf of Mexico.Y On February 21, 1991, crude oil
leaked from one of the pipelines and on April 30, 1992, crude oil leaked from the second of the two pipelines.'
On both occasions, Conoco repaired the leaks and successfully initiated clean-up efforts to rid the Gulf of
Mexico of the crude oil leaked from the two pipelines.52 During Conoco's efforts to remove the oil from the
Gulf of Mexico and to repair the leaking pipelines, Coast Guard monitored Conoco's activities.ss The Coast
Guard incurred costs of $7,841 in monitoring the first oil leak and $12,988.16 in monitoring the leak from the
second pipeline.M The Coast Guard then submitted bills, each of which went unpaid, to Conoco for each
amount.5 As a result of Conoco's non-payment of the bills, the United States initiated a suit against Conoco to
recover the billed amounts.
Conoco offered four arguments to support its contention that monitoring costs are not recoverable as
removal costs under the OPA.57 First, Conoco argued that monitoring does not fall within the definition of
"remove" or "removal" as defined by section 2701(30)58 of the OPA. 9 The statute refers to "other actions as
may be necessary to minimize or mitigate damage."60 Conoco argued that had Congress wanted to include
monitoring in this definition, it would have worded the provision to the following effect: "the taking of any
other actions as may be necessary to ensure minimization or mitigation of damages." 61 In the view of Conoco,
because monitoring is not included in the definition of remove or removal, monitoring costs can not be included
as removal costs. 6 2 Thus, Conoco argued monitoring costs are not recoverable as removal costs under the
OPA. The court rejected Conoco's argument and concluded that while the statute "is not a model of clarity,
the language is broad enough" to include monitoring costs.64

Id. § 2705(a).
Id. § 2705(bX4). The period for which interest will be charged is calculated according to sections 2705(bXI )-(3) of the Debt
Collection Act. Id. § 2705(bXl)-(3).
4
45

4

47

United States v. Hyundai Merchant Marine Co., 172 F.3d 1187, 1188 (9th Cir. 1999), cert. denied, 120 S.Ct. 397 (1999).
Cf United States v. Conoco, Inc., 916 F. Supp. 581 (E.D. La. 1996).

48 id.
4

Id. at 585.
Id. at 582.

5 Id.
52 Id.

53 Id.

54Id.
5 Id.
% Id.

Id. at 583-85.
8 Oil Pollution Act of 1990, 33 U.S.C. §2701(30) (1994). The statute reads, "'remove' or 'removal' means containment and
removal of oil or hazardous substance from water and shorelines or the taking of other actions as may be necessary to minimize or
miti ate damage." Id.
United States v. Conoco, 916 F. Supp. 581, 583 (E.D. La. 1996).
6 33 U.S.C. § 2701(30) (1994).
61 Conoco, 916 F. Supp. at 583 (emphasis
added).
62 id.
5

63 Id.

64Id.
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Conoco's second argument concerns the reference of OPA section 270265 to section 1321 of the FWPCA."
To this effect, Conoco argued that permitting the government to monitor clean-up efforts is not to say that the
costs of monitoring are recoverable as removal costs against the responsible party. The court quickly disposed
of this argument by stating that this interpretation does not "withstand scrutiny of the OPA provisions as a
whole."68
Third, Conoco based an argument on a provision of the OPA that deals with the Oil Spill Liability Trust
Fund ("Fund").6 The statute reads in pertinent part, "[t]he fund shall be available ... for the payment of
removal costs, including the costs of monitoring removal actions."70 Conoco argued that if removal costs
include monitoring costs, it is surplusage to include in the provision the phrase "including the costs of
monitoring removal actions."7 ' Conoco further suggested that because monitoring costs are recoverable by the
government from the Fund, Congress did not intend the government to recover these costs from the responsible
party.72 Finally, Conoco argued that because it pays taxes into the fund based on its petroleum enterprise, it
would be double jeopardy to include monitoring costs as recoverable removal costs under the OPA. 3 The court
was not willing to accept Conoco's interpretation of the language used in section 2712 of the OPA and further
disagreed with Conoco that the Fund was the only source from which the federal government could recover
monitoring costs. 74 Moreover, the court did not find Conoco's double recovery argument persuasive because
the Fund is a revolving fund that expends and derives its money to and from many sources.75
The fourth and final argument made by Conoco was based on the National Contingency Plan ("NCP").76
The NCP is used to guide both regulated agencies and regulated parties in the "enforcement, administration and
interpretation of environmental law."" Once there is an oil spill, the oil spill must be reported to a person
referred to as the On-Scene Coordinator ("OSC").7 1 In responding to the report, the OSC may (1) "[rjemove or
arrange for the removal of a discharge, and mitigate or prevent a substantial threat of a discharge"7 or (2)
"[d]irect or monitor all federal, state, and private actions to remove a discharge." 0 Conoco argued that for a
responsible party to be liable for monitoring costs under these provisions, the effort put forth in removing the
discharge must be inadequate.' The court did not find Conoco's argument compelling and stated that Conoco's
argument places a restriction upon the provisions that is not intended.82 Because the court did not find Conoco's
arguments compelling, the court held that "monitoring costs are included in removal costs which the
government may seek to recover from a responsible party."83
A second case that permitted the recovery of monitoring costs under the OPA is GeneralElectric Co. v.
United States Dep 't of Commerce." GeneralElectric Co. concerned the National Oceanic and Atmospheric

Administration's ("NOAA") final rulings on several provisions of the OPA." "To facilitate damage recovery,
33 U.S.C. § 2702(bX1XA) (1994).
Federal Water Pollution Control Act, 33 U.S.C. § 132 1(c)-(e) and (1)(1994). See notes 38-43 for a discussion of the relationship
between section 2702 of the OPA and section 1321 of the FWPCA.
6 Conoco, 916 F. Supp. at 583.
6
6

6 Id.

6 Id "The Oil Spill Liability Trust Fund ... is available to pay for oil-spill related costs when the spiller cannot be identified, when
the spiller can successfully defend against a charge of liability, when the spiller can invoke liability limits and claims exceed those limits,
when the spiller is not subject to United States jurisdiction ... or when a spiller is insolvent or otherwise cannot make good on its
obligations under the OPA." Cynthia M. Wilkinson et al., Slick Work: An Analysis of the Oil Pollution Act of 1990, 12 J. ENERGY NAT.
REsouRCEs & ENVTL. L. 181, 207 (1992).
' 33 U.S.C. §2712(aX) (1994).
" Conoco, 916 F. Supp. at 584.

72 Id.
73Id.
74Id.
7s Id.

Id.; The National Contingency Plan, 40 C.F.R. § 300.300 (1999).
40 C.F.R. § 300.300 (1999); Conoco, 916 F. Supp. at 585.
40 C.F.R. § 300.300(d) (1999).
Id. § 300.305(dXlXi).
* Id. § 300.305(dX lXii).
76
7
7
79

a82

Id.

83

Id.

8

128 F.3d 767 (D.C. Cir. 1997).

Conoco, 916 F. Supp. at 585.

8 Id. at 769.
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[the] OPA directs the President, acting through NOAA, to 'promulgate regulations for the assessment of natural
resource damages ... resulting from a discharge of oil.'" 6 In an NOAA final rule, the NOAA declared that
monitoring costs are recoverable as assessment costs in restoration actions under the OPA. 7 Thus, one issue
concerning the court in GeneralElectric Co. was whether the OPA permits recovery of monitoring costs in a
restoration action.8
In an effort to persuade the court that monitoring costs should not be included as assessment costs, General.
Electric Co. ("GE") made two arguments." Its first argument relied on OPA provisions that concern the Oil
Spill Liability Trust Fund ("Fund")." GE made issue of the fact that in one provision the Fund was available
for payment of removal costs including monitoring costs and in another provision, the Fund was available for
payment of restoration actions with no mention of monitoring costs."' GE concluded from this observation that
monitoring costs are not included as assessment costs and therefore can not be recoverable in restoration
actions." Given this interpretation, GE believed the NOAA acted arbitrarily in its final ruling that monitoring
costs are recoverable as assessment costs in restoration actions.
GE's argument was not persuasive to the court.4 The court found that the two provisions concerned only
the use of the Fund and not what costs are recoverable from the responsible party under the OPA.95 The court
further held that the provisions are not parallel in that "[tihe former refers only to 'removal costs,' while the
latter refers to a significantly broader activity -- 'developing and implementing plans.

'"

This was relevant

because the court found monitoring to be "necessarily include[d]" in the implementation of plans.97 Moreover,
the court held that monitoring costs are included in assessment costs in a restoration action because
"[m]onitoring is essential to ensure that restoration actions accomplish their intended goals and objectives and
do not cause unanticipated harm to the environment or public health."98 The court further stated, "monitoring is
essential to determine whether the terms of restoration agreements have been met, upon which a release from
liability is premised.""
To date there is yet to be a published case that rejected recovery of monitoring costs under the OPA. With
the exception of the instant case and the two cases referenced above, there are no other cases concerning the
issue of whether monitoring costs are recoverable under the OPA. This is not to say that responsible parties
have not been charged with monitoring costs in the past. The fact is that since the enactment of the OPA in
1990 it has been common practice for the government to include monitoring costs in its recoverable costs under
the OPA.'" One can only assume that responsible parties have not objected to the inclusion of monitoring costs
as those costs recoverable under the OPA.
C. The Debt CollectionAct - Relevant Provisions
Section 3717 of the Debt Collection Act imposes penalties and interest upon outstanding debts owed to the
United States.o' The amount of interest charged is "equal to the average investment rate for the Treasury tax
and loan accounts for the 12-month period ending on September 30 of each year, rounded to the nearest whole

8
87

Id. at 770 (citing Oil Pollution Act of 1990, 33 U.S.C. § 2706(eXI) (1994)).
General
Electric Co., 128 F.3d. at 775.

8 Id. Note the issue in GeneralElectric Co. differs from Hyundai, in that the government attempted to include monitoring costs as
assessment costs in a restoration action, and in Hyundai the government attempted to include monitoring costs as removal costs. Id. Cf
United States v. Hyundai Merchant Marine Co., 172 F.3d 1187, 1188 (9th Cir. 1999), cert.denied, 120 S.Ct. 397 (1999).
9 GeneralElectric Co., 128 F.3d at 775-7.
* Id. at 775.

9' GeneralElectric Co., 128 F.3d at 775.
9 Id.
9 Id.
9

Id. at 776 (quoting National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, 61 Fed. Reg. 440, 491 (1996)).

9 GeneralElectric Co., 128 F.3d at 776.
96 Id.
97

d.

9 Id.
9 Id.

'" United States v. Conoco, 916 F. Supp. 581, 585 (E.D. La.1 996).
101 Debt Collection Act, 31 U.S.C. § 3717(aX1) (Supp. 1H 1997).
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percentage point."'" Additional penalties shall be assessed against the debtor including "a charge to cover the
cost of processing and handling a delinquent claim" and "a penalty charge of not more than 6 percent a year for
failure to pay a part of a debt more than 90 days past due."' 03 However, the aforementioned interest will not
accrue on the penalty amount.'04 The penalties and interest assessed under the Debt Collection Act do not apply
if a "statute ... explicitly fixes the interest of charges."os
IV. INSTANT DECISION

In the instant decision, the court began by closely looking at several provisions of the OPA and of the
FWPCA.'06 In doing so, the court rejected Hyundai's argument that the OPA does not permit the recovery of
monitoring costs.' 07 The first provision the court analyzed was section 2702(a) of the OPA.'08 The court noted
the reference therein to section 1321 of the FWPCA.' After referencing the aforementioned statutory
provisions, the court concluded that the removal costs incurred by the government in monitoring Hyundai's
removal action were recoverable under the OPA. 0 The court reasoned that "the Coast Guard's actions were an
attempt to 'mitigate or prevent a substantial threat of a discharge,' § 1321 (c)( 1)(B), it was 'monitoring ...
private action to remove a discharge,' § 1321(c)(1)(B)(ii), and its monitoring was a means of 'direct [ing]
private actions to remove the discharge or to mitigate or prevent the threat of discharge' of oil, §
1321(c)(2)(A).""' To support its conclusion, the court examined the OPA's definition of removal costs" 2 and
determined that monitoring a removal action is part of the Coast Guard's "effort to prevent or minimize a
threatened oil discharge.""' Thus, the court flatly rejected Hyundai's position that the OPA definition of
removal costs does not include monitoring costs.114 In doing so, the court reasoned that Hyundai's position
"unduly minimizes the importance of the Coast Guard's emergency stand-by operation" and that such an
operation is an act of prevention, "the cost of which is ... recoverable" under the OPA. 5
In the next portion of the court's decision, the court addressed Hyundai's argument that for costs to be
recoverable under the OPA, the costs must be "necessary" to mitigate or prevent an oil discharge." 6 Hyundai
contended, to no avail, that monitoring costs are not necessary to mitigate or prevent the discharge of oil based
on the OPA's definitions of "remove" and "removal."' 17 In rejecting this argument, the court concluded that the
words 'as may be necessary' do not purport to be a limitation on reimbursement.""' The court then stated that
the relevant term in section 2702(a)"9 is not "removal" but rather "removal costs" and that the word
"necessary" is not found in the section 2701(3 1)120 definition of removal costs.12' According to the court, to
determine what costs are recoverable, one should look to the liability provisions of a statute and not the

102Id.

31 U.S.C. § 3717(eX 1), (2) (Supp. 1 1997).
31 U.S.C. § 3717(f)(Supp. 1 1997).
os 31 U.S.C. § 3717(gX1) (Supp. M 1997).
'0 United States v. Hyundai MerchantMarine Co., 172 F.3d 1187, 1189 (9th Cir. 1999), cert. denied, 120 S.Ct. 397 (1999).
03
'0

107

id.

1w Id.; Oil Pollution Act of 1990, 33 U.S.C. § 2702(a) (1994).
10 Hyundai, 172 F.3d at 1189; Federal Water Pollution Control Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1321(cX1XA)
(1994).

11 Hyundai, 172 F.3d at 1190.
II Id.
112 See Oil Pollution Act
113 Hyundai, 172 F.3d at
"

of 1990, 33 U.S.C. § 2701(31) (1994); see text accompanying note 36.
1190.

Id.

115 Id,

116 Id.

at 1191.

117 Id. See Oil Pollution Act of 1990, 33 U.S.C.

§ 2 701(30) (1994) (stating that .'remove' or 'removal' means containment and

removal of oil or hazardous substance from water and shorelines or the taking of other actions as may be necessary to minimize or
mitiate damage.").
" Hyundai, 172 F.3dat I191.
11 Oil Pollution Act of 1990, 33 U.S.C.
"0 Id. § 2701(31).
n' Hyundai, 172 F.3d at 1191.

§ 2702(a) (1994).
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definition provisions.'2 The liability provisions of the OPA do not limit recoverable costs to those costs that
are necessary.12
Hyundai next argued that if monitoring costs are recoverable under the OPA, the government is given a
"blank check permitting it to undertake all kinds of unnecessary and unreasonable actions" at the responsible
party's expense.'24 Again the court rejected Hyundai's argument based on its belief that the government action
is only unnecessary in hindsight.125 The court reasoned that under the circumstances, the Coast Guard reacted
prudently, and even though the Coast Guard's assistance was not needed to remove the oil spill, the OPA does
not limit recoverable costs to those that are necessary.'
Hyundai next argued that even if it was liable for monitoring costs, base costs are not recoverable by the
government. 1' Hyundai based this argument on the wording of section 2702(a)128 and argued that costs must
"result from" the incident before the costs are recoverable under the OPA.'29 Hyundai argued that costs such as
wages paid to Coast Guard personnel did not result from the oil spill and therefore are not recoverable. 30 The
court rejected this argument and determined that base costs such as personnel wages were a result of the oil
spill.' 3 ' The court concluded that the government should not be precluded from recovering personnel wages
simply because Coast Guard personnel would be paid to perform different tasks had the oil spill not occurred.13 2
"Base costs," according to the court, "represent real costs to the United States and are recoverable to the extent
they are allocable to a response to an oil spill."' 3 3
In a further attempt to reduce the amount of its liability, HPndai successfully argued that penalties
prescribed by the Debt Collection Act3' were not applicable.' In finding for Hyundai on this argument, the
court closely examined the penalty provisions of the Debt Collection Act and more specifically section
3717(a)(1)(e).' 36 The court applied the provision of the Debt Collection Act as written and concluded that when
a statute explicitly provides for interest on monies owed pursuant to said statute, the penalties imposed by the
Debt Collection Act are inapplicable.'3 7
V. COMMENT
A. Relevant Policy Considerations

Until August 18, 1990, the United States had a fragmented and confusing legal framework regarding
petroleum-type spills in the navigable water ways, shorelines, and certain exclusive economic zones in and
around the United States.
In its effort to clarify and extend the U.S. laws regarding oil pollution, Congress
enacted the Oil Pollution Act of 1990.139 Aside from streamlining the existing oil-spill legislation, Congress
addressed several other policy considerations.'" One of the dominant policy considerations was to extend a
responsible party's liability to ensure proper compensation to those government and private parties injured by
an oil spill and to ensure that damaged natural resources could be sufficiently restored.141 In doing so, Congress
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extended recovery to include oil removal costs by federal or state governments as well as private parties.' 42 The
OPA also provides recovery for damage to "natural resources, damage to real or personal property, loss of
subsistence use, revenues lost by the United States or state governments, lost profits and lost earning capacity,
and the increased cost of providing public services during or after cleanup activities."' 43
In United States v. Hyundai MerchantMarine Co., Ltd. the court did not consider the above policy

considerations per se and instead focused solely on the statutory language.'" The court meticulously dissected
each relevant provision of the OPA and those statutes referenced by the OPA and found that a responsible party
is liable for the costs the Coast Guard sustains while monitoring a clean up effort.' 45
It is difficult to disagree with the court that monitoring costs can be recovered under the OPA when the
OPA and the other statutory provisions referenced therein are closely read and interpreted in accordance with
the court's logic. Many would commend the court on its devotion to interpret the OPA as written. However,
the problem that the court created is that it arguably extended the scope of the OPA beyond Congress's
intentions. Viewing the policy considerations collectively it is clear that Congress intended the responsible
party to be liable for the damages resulting from oil that was spilled, regardless of who suffered the damages.'4
Included in these damages are removal costs and natural resource protection costs.147 It is clear that Congress
intended to extend the liability of the responsible party to cover damages that were not recoverable under preexisting legislation. However, it is not clear that Congress wanted to extend liability or to create another
category for recovery. Stated differently, monitoring costs are manufactured by the Coast Guard and are not
directly caused by spilled oil. Monitoring costs are avoidable in that they are not necessary to remove oil from
the water into which the oil was spilled, nor are they necessary in preserving or restoring natural resources
threatened or damaged by an oil spill. If the Congressional concerns were recovering damages and preserving
natural resources, those policy considerations are amply met without requiring the responsible party to pay for
monitoring costs. While the court read the OPA to include monitoring costs, the Congressional policy
considerations underlying the OPA are grossly unclear as to whether those costs were intended to be within the
scope of the OPA. By including monitoring costs as costs recoverable under the OPA, the court blindly
interpreted the OPA without first considering its purpose and the policy considerations Congress addressed in
enacting the OPA.
B. Negative Ramifications
In United States v. Hyundai MerchantMarine Co., Ltd. the court held that monitoring costs, including

attorney's fees and base costs, are recoverable under the OPA.'" As a result of the court's holding, Hyundai
was liable for not only the costs associated with cleaning up oil spilled from its tanker but also for the costs
associated with the Coast Guard monitoring the clean-up effort.' 49 In short, Hyundai would have been
economically better off had it not taken responsibility for its oil tanker's misfortune.
In effectively cleaning up the oil spilled from its tanker and preventing additional oil from spilling from the
tanker, Hyundai spent millions of dollars. 50 As a result of Hyundai's efforts, the oil was properly removed and
contained.s" The Coast Guard approved Hyundai's plan to clean up the oil and did not see the need to assist
Hyundai in its efforts.' One can only assume that Hyundai's clean up and prevention effort was not
substandard in the view of the Coast Guard. It can further be assumed that the Coast Guard would have taken
the same or similar action and would have had the same or similar success. Based on these assumptions, it can
be said that Hyundai sufficiently reacted to the situation and took responsibility for its actions. Nonetheless,
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Hyundai was found liable for the costs the Coast Guard sustained in monitoring the clean up and prevention
effort.
Finding defendants such as Hyundai liable for such costs greatly reduces its incentive to act appropriately
and responsibly to such oil spills. In future oil-spill situations the responsible parties may elect to stand idle and
allow the Coast Guard to man the effort needed to protect the natural resources. Their logic is easily
understandable. In not cleaning up the oil spill responsible parties will not bear the costs of both cleaning up
the oil spill and monitoring. Rather, the responsible parties will be liable only for the clean up effort put forth
by the Coast Guard. At the end of the day, responsible parties will be economically better off because they will
have spent their funds on only the clean up or prevention effort and not on monitoring the effort. It is good
policy to have responsible parties clean up oil spills. Having them act accordingly prevents the Coast Guard
from having to clean up the oil spill. As a result, the Coast Guard can focus on other situations in which its
assistance is needed rather than spending time cleaning up oil spills.
Another consequence of the court's holding is that the price of petroleum-based products will increase. It is
a well-settled practice of corporate business to distribute the risks and costs of manufacturing products across its
consumers. Anytime the costs of manufacturing or producing a product increase, the price a consumer must
pay for the product will increase. When the OPA was enacted, many scholars had precisely this concern.153
These critics argued that because the costs of transporting oil would be greatly increased under the OPA regime,
oil prices would increase and the consumer would bear the brunt of the Congressional activity.'4 With there
already being a concern of rising oil prices resulting from the OPA, requiring responsible parties to reimburse
the government for monitoring costs can only increase concerns that the price of petroleum-based products will
increase. That is not to say that the OPA was not needed to ensure proper compensation to those injured and to
preserve our natural resources; however, the amount of liability a responsible party faces should be kept in
check not only for the benefit of the party transporting oil but also for the consumer.
VI. CONCLUSION
It appears the Hyundai court interpreted the OPA correctly under the plain language doctrine. However, the
court should have focused more on legislative intent and policy rather than solely on the statutory language. As
a result of the court's strict statutory interpretation, those individuals or corporations closely connected with oil
transportation and storage should be prepared to spend extra money in the event an oil spill should occur and
the government monitors the removal effort.
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